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The EU’s Nobel Prize means that it must do even more to
overcome its current crises, and increase its role as a force for
peace and prosperity.
by Blog Admin
This morning the Nobel Prize Committee announced that they had awarded its annual peace
prize to the European Union in recognition for its efforts in promoting peace and reconciliation
in Europe over the past 60 years. Maurice Fraser argues that it would be a pity if the award
goes down in the history books as belated recognition of a job well done. Now, the EU must
recover the sense of self-belief that first drove it by restoring its economic competitiveness,
promoting free trade, increasing its role in conflict prevention and resolution, and making a
greater effort towards sharing defence responsibilities with its partners.
The Nobel committee’s decision to award the Peace Prize to the European Union is already attracting
predictable brickbats: polit ical correctness, woolly idealism, smug complacency in a crisis – the tropes are
f amiliar ones. But the committee has history on its side, because the f acts speak f or themselves. The EU’ s
predecessor, the EEC, was born in the still pock-marked terrain of  a shattered continent .It was conceived
as an experiment in peace, but it was a remarkably grounded one –  one which bore no resemblance to the
many previous thought-experiments since the 17th century. All of  these had been built on an overlay of
voluntary cooperation resting, ult imately, on a balance of  power. It was a precarious logic, repeatedly tested
(if  not continent-wide) during the 19th century; existentially challenged in 1914; and def init ively laid to rest in
1939.
It took, to coin a phrase, a man with a mission, Jean Monnet, to
chart a better way, this t ime marrying idealism with raw national
interest and, terrier- like, persuading European leaders, notably
those of  France and Germany, to will the means as well as the
ends – namely the partial pooling of  sovereignty in common
institutions and a system of  law, binding on all. The experiment
was altogether unique: f or the f irst t ime in history, proud and
sometimes ancient nation states with competing and
intermittently conf licting interests, agreed to resolve their
dif f erences without recourse to threats, blackmail and war. At the
same time, through economic cooperation, f irst with a customs
union and then a single market (even if  the latter is still work in
progress), Europeans were able to enjoy the f ruits of  trade and
the pleasures of  peace. Trade, in turn, helped peace to put down
deep roots, increasingly entwined in economic interdependence.
The Americans liked the experiment and they encouraged it. It was
a tangible and reassuring return on the investment they had made
in the continent in World War 2, and then through the Marshall
Plan and NATO. So successf ul was the experiment that the EU’s
‘sof t power’ and ‘normative power’ were to enter the language,
sometimes used alongside the hard power of  the US, sometimes (if  perversely) used in apparently
approving contrast to it. What was not in question was the EU’s magnetism and power of  example, with a
vocation to extend stability and prosperity to its east, through enlargement, and even to its south, through
trade, aid and cooperation. It was a vision of  peace writ large, upon a broader canvas than any of  the
f ounding f athers thought imaginable, let alone desirable. For all the accusations of  f antasy and hubris (and
the EU’s impotence f aced with the Arab Spring is a painf ul reality-check), there is still something valuable to
salvage f rom the draf t of  this next chapter in the EU’s ‘peace narrative’. Can 27 nation states be wrong?
But the obstacles are huge. First, there is the all-consuming nature of  the Euro crisis, monopolising the
attentions of  EU leaders, and sapping the f aith of  cit izens and taxpayers alike.  Second, the enlargement
f atigue of  the policy elites, and public disquiet about national identity and cohesion. Third, the suspicion of
f oreign entanglements and the associated costs: abroad looks just ‘too complicated’. Finally, doubts about
the ability of  the EU to use its aid, trade and diplomatic tools in ways which can really make a dif f erence in
the wider world.  How, precisely, can the EU be a serious f orce f or peace, let alone become a ‘ Kantian
power’ spreading the rule of  law and multilateral governance across an unruly world? To say nothing of  the
inexorable shif t in economic power f rom West to East, sapping the credibility of  the EU’s polit ical and
economic model, and, by extension, its voice in the world.
For the EU to play a credible role as a f orce f or peace both in its immediate neighbourhood and well beyond
its own borders, it will have to grasp a number of  nettles. First, it has to recover its credibility as an
economic actor and a f orce f or prosperity.  That doesn’t just mean solving the euro crisis which has already
inf licted so much damage on its prof ile: it means revisit ing its entire economic model to restore its
competit iveness through structural ref orms, however painf ul, at the level of  its nation states. Second, it
means f inding a clear and insistent voice in global f orums, in support of  f ree trade, openness and
competit ion. Third, it means raising its game in conf lict prevention and resolution, alongside its tradit ional
development aid programmes. Fourth, it should not lose sight of  that elusive ambition (so earnestly shared
by the Americans) to take on a bigger share of  the collective def ence ef f ort within NATO. If  that burden is
init ially shouldered mostly by France and The UK, so be it; others should f ollow suit, and not hide behind
economic austerity as an excuse f or inaction.
It would be a pity if  the Nobel committee’s award goes down in the history books as belated recognition of
a job well done. We live in a dangerous and unpredictable world, and there is much to learn f rom that
curious experiment which is the EU, located on the small western peninsula of  the Asian continent. But
imitation will not be enough. If  the EU is to be a usef ul actor in the service of  a better world, it should not
be distracted or overawed by the f ashionable narratives of  decline: it needs to recover not just its self -
belief  but the keen sense of  self - interest which drove its mission of  peace in the f irst place.
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